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
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
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COMMUNIST STATEMENTS REGARDING INTERVENTION
IN VIETNAM AND POSSIBLE NEGOTIATIONS

1 February 1966

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
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Washington 25, D. C.
1 February 1966

MEMORANDUM

Attached is a compilation of Communist statements on possible direct military intervention in the Vietnam situation, and on possible negotiations toward a settlement, received since our biweekly report (OCI No. 1018/66) issued 15 January 1966.



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SUMMARY

NEGOTIATIONS

USSR Moscow's position on the subject of negotiations has not changed in the last two weeks.

China The Chinese are continuing their vehement propaganda attack upon the US peace effort and are asserting that it is a "swindle" designed to mask US escalation of the war.

DRV From the recent propaganda statements on the subject of negotiations, it would appear that the US peace effort has in no way weakened Hanoi's resolve to prosecute the war to a "final victory" on Communist terms. Statements on the occasion of the lunar new year--Tet--reflected this confidence in eventual victory. They also indicated, however, that the

INTERVENTION

The Soviet Union's public expressions of support for the DRV have given no indication of change in its position.

Peking continues to imply that it will not take the lead in provoking a war with the US and to stress that the Vietnamese must bear the primary responsibility for defeating the US in Vietnam. Chinese public statements, however, are implying that the risk of a Sino-US war will increase as the Vietnam war escalates and are underscoring Peking's determination to prepare itself to withstand a US attack.

There have been no significant statement by the North Vietnamese on the subject of intervention during the past two weeks.

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NEGOTIATIONS

INTERVENTION

DRV war will be a long one,
Cont'd that there will be a
resumption of the US
bombings, and that the
"escalation" of the war
by the US will continue.
To this effect, recent
statements out of Hanoi
have attempted to pre-
pare the DRV populace for
a long struggle and a
resumption of the air
strikes.

NFLSV The Liberation Front has
continued to attack the
current US peace effort
as a "hoax" designed to
cover up further US
escalation of the war.
At the same time, Front
officials have reiterated
their determination to
press on with the war
despite anything the US
may do and to reach a
final victory on their
own terms.

There have been no signi-
ficant statements by the
NFLSV on the subject of
intervention during the
past two weeks.

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COMMUNIST STATEMENTS ON INTERVENTION IN VIETNAM

Selected Soviet Statements on Intervention

<u>Selected Soviet Public Statements</u>	<u>Selected Soviet Private Statements</u>	<u>Comments</u>
14 January 1966: The USSR-DRV communique following the Shelepin visit stated that the two parties "...examined specific questions relating to further Soviet assistance to the DRV in developing its economy, strengthening its defenses, and repulsing US imperialist aggression." It also stated a "new agreement was signed on additional Soviet assistance to the DRV."		The announcement of the "new agreement" was to be expected. On balance, there will probably be no drastic changes in the extent or type of Soviet aid already extended, which has been primarily defensive in nature but of a gradually increasing level of sophistication.
17 January 1966: In the Soviet-Mongolian communique following the Brezhnev visit, "the sides confirmed their readiness to go on rendering every necessary support and assistance to the fraternal socialist state--the DRV--in the struggle against imperialist aggression."		Both of these statements replay the longstanding Soviet pledge of support in strengthening the DRV's defense.
26 January 1966: CPSU Secretariat member Suslov, at the congress of the Italian Communist Party, reiterated the		

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Selected Soviet
Public Statements

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26 January 1966 Cont'd: stand-
ard Soviet statement that "The
Soviet Union is rendering all-
round support to the fraternal
people of Vietnam..." He
added that, "Under an agreement
with the DRV Government, our
country, particularly during
the past year, rendered to
Vietnam substantial assistance
for strengthening its defense
capabilities."

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Selected Chinese Communist References to Intervention

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[redacted]
the question of Chinese help to reach a peaceful settlement in Vietnam. The Chinese responded "My country has now given the order to go on a war footing. We are ready to take on the US anywhere or at any time it becomes necessary."

The Chinese attache's comments parallel Peking's recent public statements implying that China will not take the lead in provoking a war with the US, but is preparing for hostilities which it expects the US to initiate.

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[redacted]
[redacted]
stated that China would have sent troops to fight in Vietnam except for the fact that this is exactly what the US wanted an excuse to attack China--but added that China was perfectly capable of defeating the US without the aid of any other socialist state.

The charge's comments reflect continued Chinese reluctance to face a military showdown with the US together with a degree of sensitivity to possible charges that Peking's cautious behavior makes the Chinese look like paper dragons.

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20 January 1966: Liao Cheng-chih, Chairman of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission, declared that "We are planning all our tasks on the basis of the assumption that US imperialists will forcibly impose a war on us."

Peking continues to imply that it will not take the lead in provoking a war with the US.

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Selected Chinese
Public Statements

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Private Statements

Comments

20 January 1966 Cont'd: If it dares to carry out aggression against us, we are determined to deal with it to the end."

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24 January 1966: The People's Daily editorial declares that "The Chinese government and people staunchly support the firm stand of the Vietnamese people to carry through to the end their struggle against US aggression and to save the country. The Chinese people are convinced that the Vietnamese people...will certainly fight with redoubled effort and smash the Johnson administration's war extension plan and with it, the US aggressors in Vietnam."

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This is a very generalized restatement of Peking's routine pledge to support the Vietnamese. It reflects Peking's view that the Vietnamese must bear the primary responsibility for defeating the US in Vietnam.

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COMMUNIST STATEMENTS ON NEGOTIATIONS IN VIETNAM

Selected Soviet Statements on Negotiations

Selected Soviet
Public Statements

Selected Soviet
Private Statements

Comments

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Moscow's public support for Hanoi's stand on a settlement of the Vietnamese war remains unchanged. Shelepin probably sounded the North Vietnamese out on the possibility of entering talks at this time, but evidently failed to elicit any commitment.

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14 January 1966: The Soviet-DRV communique following Shelepin visit stated that the Soviet Union pledged "full support for the Vietnamese people's just struggle against US imperialism's aggression and full support for the four points of the NFLSV, the only lawful representative of the South Vietnamese people, outlined in its statement of 22 March 1965."

16 January 1966: During a speech in Mongolia, Soviet party chief Brezhnev defended the principle of "peaceful

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16 January 1966 Cont'd: coexistence," stating that Soviet foreign policy sought to "liquidate the hotbeds of war, and to settle international controversies by negotiations." At the same time, he supported the position of the DRV and the NFLSV on the question of a Vietnam settlement.

21 January 1966: TASS carried Japanese Foreign Minister Shiina's remarks which quoted Premier Kosygin as saying, "The Soviet Union is not involved in this conflict and the Soviet side naturally cannot 'mediate' in any way in this conflict."

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Selected Chinese Communist References to Negotiations

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The Chinese official was reflecting the public Chinese line on negotiations. Peking has never publicly stated that a US troop withdrawal must precede negotiations. However, the Chinese have strongly implied that this was a prerequisite for any negotiations on Vietnam.

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18 January 1966: A Chinese Foreign Ministry statement protesting alleged US military actions in Laos declared that just when the US "is energetically advertising to the whole world its 'sincere desire for peace,' US imperialism is in fact surreptitiously dropping thousands of tons of bombs" over Laos. It added, "In engineering the peace talks fraud on the

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Comments

18 January 1966 Cont'd: Vietnam question, the Johnson administration is shamelessly playing on the desire of the people of the world for peace and using mellifluous words to camouflage the barbarous war it is carrying on." [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
stated that China was against a negotiated settlement of the Vietnam problem because the Vietnamese were determined to fight until victory. He added that since the leaders in Hanoi had during the past two weeks repeatedly asserted that the acceptance of their four-point plan was essential, and as the US refused to accept the four points, it would seem impossible for any negotiations to take place. [REDACTED]

Another private variation on Peking's standard line concerning negotiations.
[REDACTED]

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24 January 1966: The People's Daily editorial declared that "The ridiculous farce of the Johnson administration on the Vietnam question has been staged for a month. It has clamored for 'peace' almost every day, but what it has done is 'war.'" It added, "Anyone who respects

Peking is continuing its propaganda blasts against the US peace effort, asserting that it is designed to camouflage US escalation of the war. [REDACTED]

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Public Statements

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Comments

18 January 1966 Cont'd: facts
will readily see that the
Johnson administration has
not the least desire to seek
a peaceful settlement of the
Vietnam question in accordance
with the will of the Vietnam
people.

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Selected North Vietnamese References to Negotiations

Selected DRV
Public Statements

Selected DRV
Private Statements

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16 January 1966: An article in the DRV party daily by "Observer" stated in part that "to reach a peaceful solution in Vietnam, the US Government must solemnly recognize the four-point stand of our government and prove it with practical deeds, and at the same time definitely and unconditionally end their bombings and other acts of war against North Vietnam."

Since the bombing pause began, DRV propaganda has laid heavy emphasis on the fact that, in addition to agreeing to the four-points, the US must prove its good intentions by practical deeds, and by unconditionally ending the bombings of the DRV.

16 January 1966: During the course of an interview with a Czech correspondent, DRV ambassador to Czechoslovakia Pham Van Su stated that "the political solution of the Vietnamese was possible only if US Government acknowledged the DRV Government's four-points and proved this by deeds."

19 January 1966: A commentary in the DRV party daily stated in part that "in reply to the US acts of war intensification and expansion, the Vietnamese people will certainly continue their talks with guns and fire. These talks will only stop

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19 January 1966 Cont'd: when the US imperialists' will to invade Vietnam is shattered. The Vietnamese people have time and again declared that in order to win back independence and freedom they are well prepared to fight for another five, ten, twenty years or more."

20 January 1966: In a letter of protest to the ICC, the Liaison Mission of the VPA High Command demanded that "the US must stop its war of aggression in South Vietnam, withdraw from there all units of US and satellite troops, all US weapons and other war materials, particularly all poison gases and other chemicals, definitively and unconditionally end the war of destruction against the DRV, and respect and correctly implement the 1954 Geneva agreement on Vietnam."

21 January 1966: The DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman issued a statement denouncing the continued strengthening of the US military establishment in South Vietnam. The

As if to counter the US peace effort, the North Vietnamese have issued a series of Foreign Ministry statements which tend to give a more official character to their

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Selected DRV
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25X1 21 January 1966 Cont'd: statement in part demanded that the US "respect and correctly implement the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam, stop its aggression against South Vietnam, withdraw all US and satellite troops and weapons from South Vietnam to allow the South Vietnamese people to settle their own affairs themselves. At the same time, the US must end permanently and unconditionally its bombing of and all other war acts against the DRV."

attacks on the US position in Vietnam. These statements have not, however, departed from the standard DRV position voiced in the DRV news media and in public statements by DRV officials.

25X1 sive. The North Vietnamese representative pointed out that although the 14 points added nothing new, if the US should change its mind about accepting Pham Van Dong's four-points as a basis for discussing, then "we can look into the matter again."

25X1 22 January 1966: VNA in a broadcast reviewing last year's "military victories"

Hanoi has repeatedly pointed to the world support its position on settling the war has

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Selected DRV
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25X 22 January 1966 Cont'd: stated
in part that "the four-point
stand of the DRV Government
and the five-point statement
of the NFLSV have received
ever broader support from the
governments and peoples of
many countries and have been
regarded as the sole, correct
basis for the settlement of
the Vietnam problem."

enjoyed as an indication that
it is in fact the most cor-
rect basis for solving the
conflict.

25X 28 January 1966: DRV Premier
Pham Van Dong replied to a
series of questions placed to

reiterated verbatim his govern-
ments four-point proposal for
settling the war and insisted
a political solution to the
war can only be envisaged
when the US accepts them, and
has proven this by actual
deeds. Dong also insisted
that the US must at the same
time stop unconditionally
and for good its air raids
and all other acts of war
against the DRV.

Dong's remarks amount to a
reiteration of the standard
position that Hanoi has
taken on settling the war.
It would appear from his re-
marks that the US peace effort
has in no way weakened the
resolve of the Vietnamese
Communists to prosecute the
war to a "final victory" on
their terms.

28 January 1966: DRV Presi-
dent Ho Chi Minh in a letter
sent to the heads of state
of the socialist countries
and other states interested
in the Vietnam situation

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28 January 1966 Cont'd: dis-
counted the US 14 point pro-
posal as an attempt by the US,
to justify "clinging to South
Vietnam and maintaining there
the puppet administration
rigged up by it and to per-
petuate the partition of
Vietnam." Ho followed up
his attack on the US posi-
tion by stating the standard
DRV position on settling the
war. He insisted that "if
the US Government really wants
a peaceful settlement, it
must accept the four-point
stand of the DRV Government
and prove this by actual
deeds. It must end uncondi-
tionally and for good all
bombing raids and other war
acts against the DRV. Only
in this way can a political
solution to the Vietnam
problem be envisaged "

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Selected National Liberation Front References to Negotiations

Selected Liberation
Front Public Statements

Selected Liberation
Front Private Statements

Comments

21 January 1966: A statement by the Central Committee of the Liberation Front stated in part that "so long as the US imperialists still refuse to act in accordance with the 22 March 1965 statement of the NFLSV, the South Vietnamese people are determined not to lay down their weapons, and millions like one man, they are determined to fight until final victory."

Liberation Front statements since the US peace offensive began have continued to reflect a determination to match whatever the US may do in a military sense in South Vietnam. At the same time they have voiced confidence that the struggle against the US will be settled on Communist terms.

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